Thursday 28 April 2016

China's Long March Into Central Asia




       China's military role in Central Asia will increasingly focus on arms sales, counterterrorism and bilateral initiatives outside the Russia- and China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
       The country's regional security efforts will reflect the need to protect growing Chinese economic interests, including the Belt and Road Initiative.
       Beijing will promote Chinese language instruction in Central Asian countries to mitigate linguistic barriers and boost cooperation.
       China's military influence in the region will continue to trail behind Russia's but will ultimately weaken Moscow's presence in the long term.
Analysis
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an unexplored frontier opened up for China to its west. Central Asia offered Beijing new sources of raw materials and new markets, as well as a major transit zone for exports, to feed China's growing and globally integrating economy. But China did not have the military means to buttress its economic position, nor did it want to unnerve Russia, a power wary of rising Chinese influence, especially in its former Soviet periphery. With these concerns in mind, Beijing carefully shaped a military and economic strategy for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Though weak upon independence, the countries retained strong security ties to Russia. Consequently, China opted to promote economic involvement in the region complemented by a subtle, unimposing military engagement, mainly as a courtesy to Russia in exchange for stable Chinese-Russian strategic cooperation.
Internally, China's economic development was and continued to be skewed. While the east coast industrialized and thrived thanks to its booming manufacturing sector, the western interior remained largely poor and undeveloped. To build up its hinterland, placate its restive Uighur population in Xinjiang province, improve its ties in Central Asia and foster interregional economic links, China sought to expand its economy westward. Not only would the move increase China's power, but it would also hedge against U.S. and Japanese efforts to contain its expansion east into the Asia-Pacific region.
China worked quickly. Starting in 2008, the country displaced Russia as Central Asia's largest trading partner and became a major lender and investor, especially in energy. By 2013, China's trade with the five Central Asian states increased from about $1.5 billion in 2001 to approximately $50 billion, compared with Russia's $31.5 billion. And even when Central Asian trade fell to $32.5 billion in 2014 because of China's slowing economic growth, the country still promised the region $64 billion in infrastructure investments. It also announced an additional $46 billion as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to build and expand land and maritime energy, trade and transit infrastructure while offloading China's excess industrial production capacity.
Furthermore, pipelines, roads and rails traversing the region — many built by China — now bring natural gas, uranium and other resources to the country, which increasingly relies on Central Asia as a trade route to the Middle East and Europe. Meanwhile, Russia's investments in the region have been lacking, and remittances from Central Asian migrants working in Russia have declined significantly, largely because of Russia's economic downturn and Western sanctions on Moscow. In short, China's Central Asian economic strategy is succeeding despite mounting domestic challenges related to slow economic growth.
Military Designs
But this growing regional economic stake has required an expanded security and military role. By 2025, the annual volume of trade between China and countries along the Belt and Road Initiative is projected to be $2.5 trillion, making it crucial that China develop its military and security partnerships worldwide, including in Central Asia. Beijing has sought to boost its counterterrorism and counternarcotics capabilities, provide for security in Xinjiang, mitigate risks resulting from instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ensure security in the region overall. In these endeavors, China strives, to the best of its abilities, to fill the security gaps that Russia, the United States and other countries are no longer capable of filling.
To that end, China has been quietly ramping up its military influence in Central Asia without upsetting the region's military balance, which disproportionately favors Russia — for now. Beijing has increased its counternarcotics, counterterrorism and special operations trainings and exercises, both inside and, more important, outside the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). An economic and security body comprising China, Russia and the Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan), the SCO is used by its members to manage cooperation and competition in the region.
Over the years, China has also increased its military aid to Central Asian countries, primarily providing uniforms along with communications and border monitoring equipment. In 2014, China agreed to provide $6.5 million in military assistance to Kyrgyzstan and promised hundreds of millions of dollars to Tajikistan for uniforms and training. Similarly, in 2016 China agreed to send almost half a billion dollars in aid to Afghanistan's armed forces. Since 2002, it has also participated in more than 20 bilateral or multilateral military exercises with the Central Asian republics. Between 2003 and 2009, China hosted 65 Kazakh officers in addition to 30 Kyrgyz and Tajik officers in 2008.
Moreover, as it continues its military modernization, China is poised to transfer more decommissioned military assets to these countries — transfers Central Asian states covet. In 2013, for example, reports surfaced that China had delivered unmanned aerial vehicles and medium- and long-range HQ-9 air defense systems to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in exchange for reduced natural gas prices. If the reports are accurate, this transaction represents a major first step toward China's goal of becoming a viable global manufacturer of sophisticated, higher-end weapons systems.
Yet in the past few years, China and Central Asian states have agreed to enhance bilateral armed forces cooperation even further, with a view to protecting China's regional investments andsupply networks, especially along the Belt and Road Initiative. Some of these emerging frameworks do not involve Russia — a sign of China's increasingly assertive foreign policy. In March, Beijing and Dushanbe reportedly discussed opening a joint counterterrorism center in Tajikistan. China also proposed a counterterrorism mechanism with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan to promote regional security in the face of militant threats, including those from the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. As regional opportunities grow, criminal organizations and militants will spread out more and engage in disruptive activities, making it important for China and its Central Asian partners to safeguard their economic and security interests.
Barriers to Cooperation
Nonetheless, China's regional military influence still trails far behind Russia's. Unlike Russia, China does not have military bases in the region, nor has it declared any intention to establish them. Beijing reportedly considered opening a military base in southern Kyrgyzstan, but both Bishkek and Beijing denied the claim. This is not to dismiss suggestions that China could take unilateral military action in the region to contain militancy. If the Chinese military were to intervene, it would be to protect Chinese citizens working on the numerous economic projects in the region, safeguard energy and supply networks, or address security risks arising from a state's potential collapse.
But China is simply unable to deploy and sustain its military forces overseas for extended periods, and, regardless, it cannot rival Russia's powerful and entrenched presence in Central Asia. Furthermore, heads of state in Central Asia are suspicious of China's economic and future military role, worrying that the country seeks to dominate the region. Additionally, different doctrines, weapons systems and language barriers constrain interoperability and cooperation with Central Asia. To overcome the linguistic hurdle, at least, China is funding the establishment of Confucius Institutes and language study programs in universities across the region.
As Beijing steadily expands its regional military influence in Central Asia, it will focus on arms sales, counterterrorism and bilateral initiatives, many outside the confines of the SCO. Protecting its economic interests will be an especially notable component of its strategy. And though Moscow has a military advantage in the region over Beijing for now, China's efforts will undermine Russia's military influence in the long term, potentially derailing the two countries' strategic partnership in the process. www.stratfor.com



The Basics is the USNI News video feature in which our staff takes on fundamental concepts, jobs and missions inside the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard and breaks them down for those who might not be as familiar with the ins and outs of the Sea Services. This month we explain the fundamentals behind the offensive power of a U.S. aircraft carrier with Capt. Rich ‘Snap’ Brophy, the commander of Carrier Air Wing 9 (CVW-9) currently deployed on USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74).

No single platform did more to transform 20th-century sea power than the aircraft carrier. The range and the combat power a carrier strike group can project quickly outpaced the massive guns of the battleship that dominated the seas prior to World War II.
Naval fighters could strike hundreds of miles away from their carriers leaving enemies with no idea where the attacks originated. After World War II, carrier strike groups became the most visible expression of American sea power.

Aboard Stennis, CVW-9 operates more than 70 aircraft. More than half of planes on the ship are Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets that can attack enemy aircraft and ground targets – the primary striking power of the carrier.

n addition to the Super Hornets, the air wing also fields specialized electronic attack aircraft – EA-18G Growlers — designed to suppress and attack enemy air defense networks to keep the air wing’s planes safe. Four Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes act as flying radars keep the strike group aware of what else is in the air.
The air wing also has a compliment of Sikorsky MH-60 Seahawk helicopters that fly missions from bringing supplies on the ship to patrolling for enemy submarines and surface ships. Rounding out the air wing is a detachment of two Northrop Grumman C-2A Greyhound cargo planes that fly personnel and equipment onto the carrier from distances beyond the range of the ship’s helicopters.
CVW-9 embarked on its current cruise in January with a compliment of 1,800 sailors tasked with not only flying the 70 aircraft on Stennis but also launching, recovering, repairing, arming, fueling and moving the aircraft on the flight deck.https://news.usni.org-By: 

SpaceX Wins First US Air Force Contract




Space Exploration Technologies Corp., known as SpaceX and headed by billionaire Elon Musk, has won its first U.S. Air Force contract to launch military satellites.
The Hawthorne, California-based company on Wednesday received a nearly $83 million agreement from the service to deliver a GPS III satellite into orbit using a Falcon 9 rocket, according to thecontract announcement. SpaceX beat out another unnamed competitor for the work.
“This launch service contract will include launch vehicle production, mission integration, and launch operations,” the announcement states.
The work will be overseen by Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base and is expected to be completed by July 31, 2008.
SpaceX is seeking to develop reusable rockets to lower launch costs.
It made headlines earlier this month when it successfully landed the first stage of its Falcon 9 rocket on a barge at sea. The company is also developing manned spacecraft for NASA. Indeed, the same day the Air Force contract was announced, the firm unveiled plans to send its Dragon spacecraft on a mission to Mars by 2018.
SpaceX is competing against United Launch Alliance LLC, a Lockheed Martin Corp.-Boeing Co. joint venture that for years has dominated the U.S. military market.
The Centennial, Colorado-based firm last week announced plans to layoff as many as 875 employees amid increasing competition in the market and restrictions on using Russian-made engines on its Atlas rockets.POSTED BY: BRENDAN MCGARRY-http://www.dodbuzz.com/





A-10 vs. F-35: Air Force warplanes to face off


.


Can an old war horse that dates back more than 40 years hold its own against the newest warbird loaded with the latest in technology and weaponry?The Pentagon said it aims to find out and will pit the venerable A-10 Warthog against the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter in a series of rigorous tests replicating what the planes would face in battle. “We are going to do a comparative test of the ability of the F-35 to perform close air support, combat search-and-rescue missions and related missions with the A-10,” Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation, told a Senate Armed Service Committee hearing on Tuesday. The F-35 has been designated to replace the A-10 in the Air Force’s main ground-attack role by 2022, but the plan has been met with skepticism by critics who say the $163 million F-35 can’t do the job as well as the $18 million A-10.”If you’re spending a lot of money to get improved capability, that’s the easiest way to demonstrate it,” Gilmore said of the planned test. The A-10 is the only plane in the Air Force specifically designed for close air support, a mission that has become urgent in the fight against ISIS in the Mideast. Able to circle over a target for long periods, the straight-winged A-10 is supremely maneuverable at low speeds and altitudes. When ground troops find themselves in trouble — and too close to the enemy for fighter jets to drop bombs without risking friendly-fire casualties — A-10 pilots can skim hillsides day and night, under any type of weather, and engage ground targets with its 30 mm, seven-barrel Gatling gun, which fires depleted uranium bullets at 3,900 rounds per minute. 



The F-35 is designed to fulfill a variety of roles, close air support among them, so it won’t function exactly in the same manner as the A-10, Pentagon officials said. “The F-35 will not do close air support mission the same way the A-10 does. It will do it very differently. The A-10 was designed to be low, and slow, and close to the targets it was engaging, relatively speaking,” Frank Kendall III, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, told the Senate panel Tuesday. “We will not use the F-35 in the same way as the A-10..” We’re going to let the F-35 pilots take advantage of the systems on that aircraft … and see how well the missions are carried out in terms of the ability to strike targets in a timely manner and accurately, and then report on that,” Gilmore said. Different or not, the Pentagon expects the F-35 to come out the winner in the face-off because it can handle different roles.”Clearly the F-35 should have an advantage in higher threat environments than the A-10 does,” Gilmore said at Tuesday’s hearing. “If you asked an A-10 to do air-to-air, it’s hopeless,” Kendall said. The F-35 is designed to “do a variety of missions: air dominance, strike and close air support.”And the Pentagon said, close air support has changed since the A-10 came on line in 1975. What’s different now than when the time the A-10 was conceived is the use of precision munitions and the ability of a wide variety of aircraft to put a munition-like, small-diameter bomb exactly where they want it to go,” said Kendall, who pointed out that such munitions let platforms like the B-1 bomber provide close air support. Even if the F-35 wins the upcoming showdown with the A-10, it may not mean it won’t face another challenger in the future. Lt. Gen. Mike Holmes, Air Force deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and requirements, said earlier this month the service would consider other alternatives to the A-10.”My requirements guys are in the process of building a draft-requirements document for a follow-on (close air-support) airplane,” Holmes said.

..http://idrw.org . Read more at India No 1 Defence News Website , Kindly don http://idrw.org/a-10-vs-f-35-air-force-warplanes-to-face-off/#more-93457 .

Wednesday 27 April 2016

Russia's ‘White Swan’: a new strategic bomber


Russian designers are working to develop a "transitional" supersonic strategic bomber based on the Tupolev Tu-160. Military experts say the new ‘White Swan’ Tu-160M2 could take on existing air defence and missile defence systems of potential enemies, and give designers more time to develop a new-generation aircraft of the same class.


Russia's Defence Ministry has opted to develop a medium-term replacement for the ‘Prospective Long-Range Aerial System’ (the PAK DA, a new-generation strategic bomber/missile carrier – ed.) aircraft given the4 delays that the project is facing. The new-generation strategic bomber will be based on the Soviet Tupolev Tu-160 aircraft.
A defence industry source said the project could become one of the Defence Ministry's most expensive programmes in the 2020s. The source said the project cost is comparable to the Borei project, to develop new nuclear-powered submarines equipped with Bulava missiles; between $5 and 7 billion.
"As yet, it is unclear how much the upgrade will affect the whole aircraft: will it be only the avionics that get updated, or the engines, ammunition, cooling and navigation systems, and so on, as well? The cost of the Tu-160M2 project will vary depending on these aspects, and could reach five to seven billion dollars," the source said.

What kind of aircraft will the new Tu-160M2 be?

The Tu-160, or the ‘White Swan’, as pilots have called it, is the most powerful supersonic bomber/missile carrier in the history of military aviation.
Valery Solozobov, Deputy General Director for Design and R&D at Tupolev, said the Tu-160M2 will represent a revolutionary design solution, even if it looks like the previous version.
"In particular, the aircraft will have the most advanced electronics, and will also be equipped with innovative electronic warfare and fire control solutions," said Solozobov.
According to Solozobov, the aircraft has been enhanced in line with contemporary requirements, and will have systems to make it invulnerable to the air defence and missile defence systems of a potential enemy, whether current or in development.
"In terms of its external appearance, the 'White Swan' will retain an integral low-wing configuration (with the wing passing through the bottom of the fuselage: Ed.) with a variable-sweep wing. It will have tricycle landing gear and an all-moving tail-plane and fin," he said.


Solozobov explained that all the components of the Tu-160M2 were being made by Russian companies, and the sanctions against Russia would have no effect on the production of the new aircraft.
Viktor Bondarev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, said the aircraft would make its maiden flight in early 2019, and mass production was likely to start in 2023. The Defence Ministry, he said, plans to buy at least 50 Tu-160M2 aircraft.

What kind of weapons will the new Tu-160M2 be able to carry?

"The term 'missile carrier' highlights the bomber's capacity to use both nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles. These include new-generation Kh-101 and Kh-555 long-range cruise missiles," said a defence industry source.
According to the source, the aircraft would also be capable of carrying Kh-55SM cruise missiles with inertial guidance.
"The Tu-160 may be equipped with any types of nuclear and conventional bombs: armour-piercing, concrete-piercing, cluster, naval mines, and so on. The combined weight of these weapons can be up to 40 tonnes," said the source, a military expert.
The new aircraft would be able to hit targets outside the engagement zone of existing air defence and missile defence systems. The Tu-160M2, said the source, would be one of the few aircraft capable of circling the globe, by refuelling twice in mid-air.

Specifications of the "basic" Tu-160

Crew: 4
Length: 54.10 m (177 ft 6 in);
Height: 13.10 m (43 ft 0 in);
Wingspan: 35.60 m (116 ft 9¾ in) / 55.70 m (189 ft 9 in)
Empty weight: 110,000 kg (242,505 lb)
Maximum takeoff weight: 275,000 kg (606,260 lb)
Fuel weight: 148,000 kg (326,280 lb)
Maximum speed:
- 2200 km/h (1,380 mph) at 10 km (32,800 ft)
- 1030 km/h (640 mph) at 3 km (9840 ft)
Maximum range without refuelling: 18,950 km (11775 miles)
Combat radius: 6000 km (3725 miles)
Service ceiling: 22,000 m (72,175 ft)
NIKOLAY LITOVKIN,  in.rbth.com

Mitsubishi X-2 completes maiden sortie


The Mitsubishi X-2 fighter technology demonstrator aircraft has conducted its maiden flight from Nagoya International Airport.

The jet performed basic operations during the flight including climbing, descending, and circling, says Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in a statement.
After the flight, the MHI test pilot said the aircraft was “extremely stable” and handling was identical to pre-flight simulations.
“The X-2 is a prototype stealth aircraft - the first in Japan to feature technology impeding its detection by radar - engineered for extremely high manoeuvrability,” says MHI. “The prototype integrates an airframe, engines, and other advanced systems and equipment all adaptable to future fighters.”
MHI has been working on the programme for seven years with 220 domestic companies. Japan’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ALTA) is also playing a major role in the programme.
The aircraft, formerly designated ATD-X, is designed to help Japan explore advanced fighter technologies such as stealth, thrust vectoring, advanced sensors, and datalinks. It will not be developed into an operational fighter aircraft, but rather help Tokyo gain know-how for future fighter programmes.
Powered by two IHI XF5-1 low-bypass engines, the aircraft small by fighter standards with a length of 14.2m (46.5ft) and a wingspan of 9.1m.BY: GREG WALDRON  www.flightglobal.com

Turkey’s fighter aircraft choices: From hard to hardest




Turkey prepares to phase out its fleet of F-16 fighters by 2030 due to high upgrade, repair and maintenance costs, it faces challenging options to rebuild a solid fleet with deterrent firepower. 

“We need to think more creatively if we should avoid any aerial operational weaknesses in the next 20 years when we expect to be fighting a multitude of asymmetrical - and perhaps - conventional security threats,” said one senior Air Force official. 

Turkey remains committed to the multinational Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the most expensive ever weapons program with a lifetime price tag of $1.5 trillion.

As part of the program, Turkey’s top defense procurement panel, the Defense Industry Executive Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, ordered in early March the defense procurement agency, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), to place an order for eight more F-35 fighter aircraft. 

“The decision confirms Turkey’s commitment to the program,” said one defense official. 

But the JSF program is facing several problems which are annoying Turkey’s defense and military officials. 

“We hope the future of the program goes smoother than its past,” said one defense official. 

“For us the most important parameter is the delivery schedule,” said the Air Force official. 

On March 24, Gen. Christopher Bogdan, who oversees the JSF program, said in a written testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services subcommittee on tactical air and land forces that the F-35 would not get its combat capability package until late 2017, putting the long-delayed aircraft another four months behind schedule. The reason for the most recent delay is software testing issues on the newer 3F software, especially the knock-on-effect of past delays on older versions of the software.

According to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester, the JSF program will be delayed for one year due to several technical shortfalls, including problems with radar software.

Recently, Pentagon evaluators cited major problems with the F-35’s software, both on the ground and aboard the aircraft. For instance, maintenance software designed to diagnose problems fail to detect the difference between healthy parts and defective ones. Also a communication problem between the F-35’s radar computer and its central computer cause the radar to switch off roughly every four hours of flight time. That requires pilots to reboot it.

Earlier in March, the Pentagon forecast a 3 percent drop in acquisition costs for the F-35. But said plans to use the jets for six more years would add about $45 billion to the projected operating costs through 2070.

The Defense Department’s annual report on major weapons programs forecast the total cost of the stealth fighter jet program would reach $1.5 trillion by 2070 including development and procurement, as well as operating costs and inflation. That was up from the previous estimate in 2014 of $1.41 trillion.

Turkey plans to buy 100 F-35s. Meanwhile, Ankara is thriving to go ahead with its indigenous fighter aircraft program, dubbed TFX, which will require an initial investment of $6-7 billion. Turkey’s military and defense officials are in pre-contract negotiations with U.K.-based BAE Systems for the ambitious program.

Turkey hopes to finish the fighter’s prototype by 2023. By 2019, 80 percent of design, electrical and electronic components, flight, warfare and communications systems and manufacturing plans will have been completed. 

“The Turkish plan is a little bit too optimistic,” said one international aerospace expert. “There surely will be numerous anticipated and unanticipated technical glitches along the path. I think the Turks should better devise contingency plans for major delays in this program, beyond what they calculate today.”

“We want this program to proceed flawlessly. We cannot afford to face operational weaknesses due to an aging fleet [of F-16s] and delays in two major fighter programs,” said the Air Force general.-http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
Strategic Air Defense Systems and Turkey’s Road Map

The “T-LORAMIDS” Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems Tender that was expected to be concluded for a long time was cancelled with the Prime Ministry’s declaration on 15th November 2015.  Following the cancellation, the messages conveyed at the “Strategic Air Defense Systems and Turkey’s Road Map” event organized by SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) on the 26th of October gained more importance.
SETA’s Director of Security Research Assistant Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş was the moderator of the panel on “Strategic Air Defense Systems and Turkey’s Road Map” organized by SETA and the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries. Undersecretary for Defense Industries Prof. İsmail Demir, Faculty Member of MEF University Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Faculty Member of İzmir University of Economy Dr. Sıtkı Egeli, Aselsan Deputy Director General Mr.Mustafa Kaval and Roketsan Deputy Director General Dr. Sartuk Karasoy attended the event as panelists. Turkey’s strategies for the upcoming period were examined during the panel and the participants were informed on the significant clues regarding the cancelled T-LORAMIDS program.

The event was launched with the opening remark of SETA Director of Security Research Assistant Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş and Undersecretary for Defense Industries Prof. İsmail Demir took the floor as the first panelist. In his speech, Prof. Demir pointed out that missile defense systems were systems utilizing quite complicated systems in an integrated manner and mentioned that in case of a ballistic missile attack, following the identification of the threat, the threat should be classified through the supersensitive guided systems and then immediately destroyed. Prof. Demir added that in order to struggle against the stratified threats, the technological development capable of achieving the fight against greater threats should be accomplished immediately.

Prof. Demir stated that developing Turkey’s Air Defense System fell under the responsibility of the Undersecretariat and added that Turkey was undergoing a tender process. Prof. Demir underlined important subjects regarding the upcoming period: “With the announcement of the winner of the T-LORAMIDS tender, several arguments in world opinion arose. Turkey’s increasing its self-sufficiency in Air Defense Systems -as well as all other areas- is the point we attach importance. Our plans regarding this point are continuing. Considering this issue, our domestic defense industry companies are continuing their activities in the field of Low and Medium Altitude Air Defense Systems. We believe that these efforts will make significant contribution to our Indigenous Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems”. Given the ever-changing world conjuncture, Prof. Demir pointed out that the decision-makers desired to see their systems operating in the field as soon as possible, he emphasized that Turkey needed to remain prepared against surrounding threats at all times and immediately create its air defense shield.

In his speech, Head of MEF University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu underlined the requirement of the correct identification of the threat during the struggle against threats, regardless of its type. Prof. Kibaroğlu stated that the identification, categorization and eventually the destruction capacities regarding the military and ballistic threats should be acquired immediately. Reminding the participants that Turkish Air Forces’ existing air defense systems had the capacity to resist merely to threats of certain levels; Prof. Dr. Kibaroğlu added that Turkey had a limited defense capacity with the current resources and capabilities. Prof.Dr. Kibaroğlu also reminded that Turkey’s interest in missile defense systems was not new and told that especially military circles were interested in this area in the 90s and added that during the 1st Gulf War in 1991, hit rate of the Patriot missiles was 13 percent. Stating that following the Gulf War in 90s, there was no progress in the ARROW project upon which Turkey, US and Israel negotiated and told that when the representatives of USA and Israel were inquired about the reason behind this, each party blamed each other. Prof. Dr. Kibaroğlu expressed that though Turkey was not yet at the desired point, it was now in a better place considering the defense area and stressed that the country needed to strengthen its Smart Power in order to avoid the surrounding threats. Prof. Dr. Kibaroğlu concluded his speech saying that the Western allies’ insistence on Turkey not procuring its missile defense system from China was meaningless as these countries did not make use of the opportunities handed over them many times before.

In his remark, İzmir Economy University Faculty Member Dr. Sıtkı Egeli expressed that the air defense systems were far more different than the conventional weapon systems and they remained in an area where countries’ defense strategies and “Grand Strategies” intersected each other. Touching upon the features of the ballistic missiles, Dr. Egeli warned the participants that the identification of such missiles were quite difficult before and after their launch and that as a result of their ability to move fast, the reaction duration of the targets were quite short. Reminding that most of the ballistic missile flights took place at the in space, Dr. Egeli noted that this feature made the conventional preparations meaningless. Dr. Egeli spoke of another feature of the ballistic missiles and said that their speed increased in parallel with the increase in their range and thus it became more impossible to resist against them. Dr. Egeli mentioned that against the ballistic missile attacks, in addition to the air defense systems, special sensors and satellite systems located in space to make the first warning were required and underlined that these systems were currently owned by USA, Russia and Israel. Stating that in case of the existence of the sufficient technology, it would be relatively easier to stop the ballistic missiles in space, Dr. Egeli stressed that the sooner a missile is stopped, the wider the protected area would be. On the other hand, Dr. Egeli said that the attacking party would always be a step ahead of the defense when the ballistic missiles are at hand and stated that defense would be harder and more expensive. Addressing the statements of the representatives of the USA, that spent $ 350 billion toward missile defense systems in the last thirty years, Dr. Egeli emphasized that this was not a battle to be won on the financial side. Dr. Egelistated that Turkey has been under the missile threat since the 1960s and that it became interested in the systems with ranges over 300 kilometers in 1990s. Dr. Egeli recalled that the ranges of the ballistic missiles manufactured by Iran exceeded 1.100 kilometers and stressed that following this development, the stage of preventing these missiles in space should be adopted step by step. Dr. Egeli additionally noted that Turkey became interested in the Russian ballistic missiles since 2008 as Russia started to utilize these missiles against Georgia. Lastly, Dr. Egeli said that Turkey’s overall air defense was based on aircrafts, that ground stationed systems were weak and therefore the country suffered from an overall weakness.

In his presentation, Roketsan Deputy Director General Dr. Sartuk Karasoy summarized the technological developments in missile defense systems and mentioned that the ballistic missile defense systems’ operations were getting more complex each day in parallel with the technological developments in that field. Dr. Karasoy underlined a technical feature of the ballistic missiles is that of the impossibility of interfering them during a major part of their flight after they are launched. Dr. Karasoy told that even though they expected that the SM-3 and THAAD systems would be available for Turkey’s access within the NATO framework, due to the role determined for Turkey as part of NATO’s overall defense concept, Turkey was unable to access these systems. He underlined that, therefore, Turkey should be developing a “Turkey centered system” to abolish its foreign dependency. Dr. Karasoy added that in addition to a ballistic missile defense system Turkey has to adopt “space” as a strategic target in order to acquire a ballistic missile defense capability in a wider sense.

Aselsan Deputy Director General Mr. Mustafa Kaval made a presentation on the air and missile defense systems and assessed Turkey’s current status in these areas. Mr. Kaval stated that the air and missile defense systems should actually be defined as the system of systems for in these systems numerous systems were functioning in an integrated manner. Mr. Kaval noted that the communication infrastructure, sensor systems, weapon systems and the command control systems within the air and missile defense systems were extremely complex structures nested within each other. Mr. Kaval stressed that a severe system engineering approach was necessary for all levels in order to make progress in the studies and activities to this end and reminded the participants of the vital importance of the correct need assessment. Moreover, Mr. Kaval told that the acquisition of T-LORAMIDS system-program would not be fully solving Turkey’s air defense requirements, and underlined that increasing the number of such systems, their expansion were required for locating Turkey under the full protection of the shields offered by these systems.
In the Q&A session of the panel, regarding the question about the current situation of Turkey within the scope of the missile defense system tender, Undersecretary for Defense Industries Prof. İsmail Demir expressed that the tender process was a dynamic one in the sense of proposals and negotiations and Turkey was about to reach a final decision taking Turkey’s needs and interests into consideration and that they passed to the final stage of the tender.



Where is Turkey Heading after the T-LORAMIDS?
Following these remarks, an important decision was reached on 15th November 2015 regarding the T-LORAMIDS program that has been occupying the agenda for quite a long while and the cancellation of the tender that was initiated eight years ago was announced to the public opinion. So, how was the procurement plan initiated? How was Turkey’s Ballistic Missile Threat perception formed? In order to reach a better understanding and see the big picture, we need to reconsider the cold war era and observe the Middle East geography dominated by wars and conflicts. Turkey’s introduction to the ballistic missiles threat that was increased especially in the 1980s, developed and expanded their utilization scale occurred in 1991 with the 1st Gulf operation. The SCUD, R-17 and EL-Hussain missiles in the inventory of the Iraqi Army were used against the coalition countries and Israel many times. Within this scope, Turkey remaining in the hot line began to perceive the Ballistic Missile threat this close for the first time. With the ballistic missile attacks displayed live and the scale of the threat formed and the escalating defense perception, made it compulsory for Turkey, which was one of the most important actors of the conflicted region, to take steps to this end. In that period, against the Ballistic Missile threats, Turkey only owned the “Nike – Hercules” missiles manufactured in 1959 that were designed in line with the cold war concept and doctrines of the 1960s and intended to intercept the Soviet aircraft fleets. These systems in the inventory that were designed according to the old and cold war doctrines were way behind the rapidly developing, evolving, ballistic missile threats that were rapidly increasing their range and velocity. Protection of major cities, military bases with great importance, critical facilities in particular, had to be provided through long range air and missile defense systems and this point became one of the privileged topics of Turkey. During the Gulf War, the American Patriot systems located in Turkey were once intended to be procured via the Foreign Military Sales, however the procurement plans were suspended due to the economic crisis that Turkey went through in 1994 and as a result of the ensuing political ambiguities it could not be implemented at all.
Ten years after, in 2006, within the scope of a plan formed by the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries authorized by the Ministry of National Defense, on 30 June 2006 with a decision adopted by the Defense Industry Executive Committee, the T-LORAMIDS (Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems) Program was initiated. Following the preparation of the feasibility studies and the Request for Proposal (RFP), in 2010 RFP including the technical specifications were issued. In the tender, executed through the foreign direct procurement method, Lockheed Martin-Raytheon consortium proposed “Patriot PAC II/III”, French – Italian consortium Eurosam offered “SAMP/T”, Russian Rosoboronexport Company offered Antey 2500 and Chinese CPMEIC Company offered FD-2000 (the export version of HQ-9) to Turkey in their proposals. The final decision was announced through Defense Industry Executive Committee’s (SSIK) decree of 26th September 2013. It was decided to initiate the contract negotiations with China Company CPMIEC and in case an agreement could not be reached with them then negotiations were supposed to made with French – Italian consortium Eurosam that was the second company in the tender. Meanwhile, in order to avoid the exclusion of Eurosam and the American party from the process, Turkey reached decisions on extending the validity of the proposals for their revision two times. Taking the operational requirements of the coming 20-30 years, Turkey was determined to procure the most developed and improved systems. Moreover, in the procurement of the aforementioned system, in line with its strategic plan Turkey identified certain significant criteria such as the infrastructure to be established within the country, the joint production areas, technology transfer, industrial participation, etc. As these criteria could not be met at the expected level and for the parties could not reach an understanding, this two-year-long adventure ended on 15th November 2015.

The severe messages conveyed by the Turkish party before the cancellation were already the indicators of direction of the tender headed. A year before the cancellation of announcement, prior to the NATO Summit of 2014, President Mr.Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that there were problems with the Chinese party regarding know-how and joint production issues, that the Italian – French consortium listed as the second winner of the tender revised and submitted its proposal and that they were conducting the negotiations in this context. These declarations, uttered by the highest rank of the state, underlined that Turkey was adamant about its sine qua non criteria regarding the maximum domestic participation ratio, industrialization and technology transfer and would not take a further step before they were fully met. Following the aforementioned message from the top authority of the state, at the ADEX 2014 event that took place in Azerbaijan in September 2014, the sector’s senior executives made important remarks considering the Indigenous Long Range Air and Missile Defense System, the feasibility studies of which were carried out simultaneously with the T-LORAMIDS program. The sector’s prominent actors, Aselsan and Roketsan officials stated that they were prepared to develop Indigenous Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems with the help of the know-how they acquired from the Low and Medium Altitude Air Defense Missile Systems and by making the following remark that read, “Our negotiations on the technical scope are continuing and we reached a certain level in Low and Medium Altitude Air Defense Systems. We agreed that we had the capacity to accomplish these activities within the scope of ‘high altitude’ and believe that we would complete this program in a five-year-period”.They conveyed the message both to Turkish public opinion and to the actors competing in the tender. Following the messages given in the last quarter of 2014, the electoral atmosphere in the country, and in addition to the changes in the world conjuncture, the program did not appear in the agenda until June 2015. The negotiations were conducted quietly and then in June 2015,it was claimed within the defense source that the negotiations were blocked on the technology transfer issue. Eventually, on 15th November 2015, the cancellation of the tender was announced to publicly.



So, what are Turkey’s options now, following this decision? Has Turkey identified a Road Map?Due to their architecture, the High Altitude Air and Missile Defense Systems are composed of very complex systems and sub systems. Turkey has a threshold to get by on this issue, but fortunately there are some promising developments too. In the exclusive interview our magazine made with Aselsan’s General Manager Dr. Faik Eken in November 2015, he noted that they had the infrastructure capable of manufacturing long range search and fire control radars that were considered to be the most critical components of the Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems and said, “With our infrastructure level and with the know-how we acquired, we are capable of developing these radars. We are perfectly able to produce both the modules used in these radars and the Gallium Nitrate transistors used in the modules through our national resources. Regarding the radars, we formed the know-how capable of design and production without foreign dependence at all levels. The first application of this capacity was launched in the Low and Medium Altitude Air Defence Missile Systems “Hisar” and Self – Propelled Low Altitude Air Defense System “Korkut” projects. As Aselsan, we designed and manufactured the search and fire control radars within the scope of these projects. We are getting quite successful results in the ongoing field tests with these radars”. Additionally, in his special statement to our magazine in September 2015, Defense Industry System Projects and Logistics Deputy Undersecretary Mr. Mustafa Şeker relayed important messages by saying, “We are hoping that Turkey will be fulfilling the radar requirements of the Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems within the next four-years-period”. These optimistic messages given by the prominent representatives of the sector may seem to pave the way in front of Turkey, yet the country has lost a great amount of time considering the urgent requirements and the increasing threat perception. And bridging this gap does not seem so easy in the short run. Unfortunately, Turkey does not have many options in this context. According to the best case scenario assessed, through the technology transfer and support accomplished in the critical technologies arena, Turkey would be putting forth a prototype system in 5 to 10 years’ time. Meanwhile, the indigenous development studies of ‘‘Hisar A’’ and ‘‘Hisar O” Projects continue and currently the sub system development and test activities are being conducted, a certain level of maturity has been reached considering the design of the ground systems and missile sub systems but it is stated that for the qualification and serial production of these systems, another 3 or 4 years’ period would be required. So, what kind of a Road Map does Turkey have ahead? Should Turkey continue its progress stage by stage with the extended version of the “Hisar A” and “Hisar-O” systems that were indigenously designed through local resources? Or would it be better to create its own high altitude air and missile defense system by making a technology transfer and shortening the period with a partner country?
The response to all of these questions surely lies beneath Turkey’s perception of threats. Are the targets, “Air Breathing Targets” such as the UAVs, Combat Aircrafts, Fighter Aircrafts, and Cruise Missiles? Or are they the ballistic missiles that contain 30% of the threat perception yet requiring a different category? Or should all of the aforementioned be considered?
Besides all of these options, during and after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to France in December 2015, the Air Forces Command and representatives of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries’ participation in the SAMP/T system’s fire test conducted in Italy indicate to us that there is still a third option on the table. 2016 will be a year that we will learn the answer to many of these questions. We wait in anticipation and we will follow the progression as this topic unfolds.

by Cem Akalın-http://www.defenceturkey.com/