The Pentagon Is Killing A Combat-Proven Aircraft That Most Troops Totally Love

The A-10 Thunderbolt II, endearingly referred to as the Warthog for its snubbed-nose design, is set for retirement in the 2015 budget as deep cuts to military funding will go into effect.

This planned retirement is deeply unpopular. The Warthog has a tried and true track record of providing close air support to ground troops. Critics of the retirement maintain that the Air Force is simply trying to retire the plane to make way for more exciting, but unproven, future aircraft like the F-35.

The Air Force says it has no choice but to retire the aging plane. It expects that retiring the total fleet of A-10s by 2020 will save an estimated $3.7 billion.

Still, the move is deeply unpopular with both policy-makers and soldiers.

The Warthog was first developed in the early 1970s by Fairchild Aviation with the sole aim of providing close air support against tanks and other armored structures for ground troops.

U.S. Air Force photo/Maj. David Kurle

Central to the A-10's design is the GAU-8 Avenger, a 30 mm rotary cannon, which functions as the plane's main offensive weapon.

Justice League / Wikimedia

The rotary cannon uses depleted uranium rounds due to their extreme effectiveness at tearing through armor. These rounds also self-ignite when exposed to oxygen after hitting a target.

Reuters Photographer / Reuters

Although the A-10's principal weapon is its cannon, the plane is also typically equipped with AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles. It may also carry cluster bombs or Hydra rocket pods.

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The Warthog is almost like a flying tank. Its thick armor allows it to engage forces on the ground effectively, while enduring hits that could down more lightly armored aircraft.

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Warthogs first saw combat during the 1991 Gulf War, where it flew with a mission capable rate of 95.7%.

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Although pilots at first were hesitant to fly the Warthog, preferring fast maneuverable aircraft, the Warthog was the most effective craft of the war. All together, it destroyed more than 900 tanks and 2,000 other military vehicles.

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During the war in the Balkans, A-10s helped to provide air support for NATO operations.

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The role Warthogs played during the War in Iraq can not be overstated, flying 32% of all sorties during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

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Warthogs have been of major importance in Afghanistan as well; they have helped to protect soldiers pinned down by fire from Taliban ambushes.

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Since the Warthog was designed specifically for air support, the plane also performs well during search and rescue missions. Here, a Warthog drops flares in a training exercise.

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"There's something about 30 mm [high-explosive rounds] being fired at over 4000 rounds per minute that makes me happy," one Marine combat veteran told Business Insider.

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Said another: "Just make sure the A-10 confirms your location before he goes hot. If not, your life expectancy goes from about 80 percent to like 40."

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The A-10 is slated to be replaced by the F-35, the single most expensive military purchase in U.S. history.

Brian Adam Jones for the United States Marine Corps

F-35s are being heralded as a Jack of all trades aircraft, with promises that it can provide air support just as effectively as it can dog fight.

DVIDS

So far, support for the F-35 has been limited among reports that its hull is susceptible to cracking and that its computer system could be hacked.http://www.businessinsider.com/

THE FUTURE OF CHINA’S EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

China’s top maritime priorities will remain in the East and South China Seas. Nevertheless, extended expeditionary ambitions are real. However, more assertive Chinese behavior on blue-waters does not mean that great power conflict is inevitable. The upcoming East Asia Summit may be a forum for finding solutions.

Back to the USSR?

Global Soviet naval presence in the 1980s

China does not seek an overseas presence as the Soviets did in the 1980s. They simply cannot do it yet. The USSR needed decades to establish a global naval presence. For China, it would not be different. However, the world is watching how China is on the march to reach the status of a ‘medium global force projection navy’, comparable to the British and French. In terms of numbers, but not in terms of quality, Beijing’s navy has already surpassed Paris’ and London’s and the naval armament goes on:

During 2013 alone, over fifty naval ships were laid down, launched, or commissioned, with a similar number expected in 2014. Major qualitative improvements are occurring within naval aviation and the submarine force, which are increasingly capable of striking targets hundreds of miles from the Chinese mainland.

Moreover, ‘medium global force projection navy’ does not necessarily mean that thereare warships in all oceans. It means that China could globally project power in one or two theaters simultaneously, if its political masters so decide. Besides the question of whether a Chinese naval presence outside the Pacific really would have a serious impact, political prestige must also be taken into account. Britain’s Indian Ocean presence does not make a difference. However, London decides to go there just because they can, and to pretend that Britain is still a global power. Beijing’s political and military elites might feel the same way. Often criticized is China’s military bureaucracy and corruption. However, for naval power projection, it does not matter whether Chinese officers in Xingjang or Tibet are corrupt Maoist bureaucrats.

The PLAN’s second aircraft carrier is under construction. Given a six-year construction time, the new carrier will be commissioned in the early 2020s. Present reports say, moreover, that China aims to build in total at least four carriers. However, except for aresearch program for nuclear-propulsion, there is not yet credible evidence that one of the carriers will be nuclear-powered. 

PLAN carrier strike groups

Accompanied by two destroyers, two frigates and two submarines, China’s carrier has been deployed for the first time to the South China Sea. Militarily, Liaoning‘s trip may just have been an exercise. Politically, however, it was a clear message from Beijing: Our carrier can go to the South China Sea and we are there to stay. This has been the first “show of force” by a Chinese carrier strike group. More will follow. Simple exercises could have been done in closer home waters.

However, the more China invests in carriers, the less money will be available for other capabilities, like cruise missiles or submarines. Criticism on carrier acquisition often ignores that, after World War II, carriers have not been used in open-sea battle between major powers. Instead, carrier operations always targeted weaker countries or supported land operations. Due to the lack of combat experience, the Chinese would never act so irrationally that they would try to take on a US carrier strike group in open battle. If they would, it would end up in a slaughter. Chinese carriers would primarily go for show-of-missions targeted at inferior Indo-Pacific states, like Vietnam or the Philippines.

Moreover, in the earthquake, typhoon, and volcano plagued Indo-Pacific, Chinese carriers are much more likely to go for disaster relief rather than combat. Rather than fighting them, Chinese carriers will join their US counterparts in delivering water, food and medical care. Naval diplomacy and outreach to partners like Brazil will come along, too. However, wherever China’s carriers go, they will have ‘close friends’: US attack submarines.

Indian Ocean deployments

Since 2008 the PLAN has had a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean, officially in order to fight piracy. However, one side effect is the build-up of a new overseas presence. To understand what China could (not) do in the Indian Ocean it makes sense to look back at what the Soviets did. Their naval presence in the Indian Ocean (late 1960s – 1991) was normally between 5-10 surface warships and a few submarines. However, there were no Soviet carrier operations, just due to the lack of carriers. Moscow’s intentions were a show of force, surveillance of US activities (like the SIGINT station on Diego Garcia) and, in case of war, to open up an additional naval front to bind US capabilities, raid US supply lines and prevent US SSBN from striking Central Asia.

China faces the same challenges as the Soviets did: Access through vulnerable choke points; no direct supply line by land and therefore the need for bases or port access; no air bases for immediate air support. As a consequence, China’s approach would not be too different from the Soviets’. Even though the Somali pirates are in retreat and international counter-piracy operations will be downsized, China is likely to somehow keep an Indian Ocean presence out of its national interests.

Chinese LPD Changbaishan The recent Indian Ocean exercises of the Chinese LPD Changbaishan accompanied by two destroyers underline Beijing’s extended expeditionary ambitions. That one of the PLAN’s most sophisticated vessels was sent indicates that further intentions exist. However, for a real deployment such a squadron would need supply ships and tankers.

Nevertheless, in India, China’s exercises caused concern about the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Beyond India, weaker Indo-Pacific countries like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, the Philippines, and Vietnam were psychological targets of this show-of-force. In Australia, Changbaishan’s Indian Ocean tour led to the perception of a change in its strategic environment. Although a quick and limited tour, the PLAN’s Indian Ocean exercises obviously already matter.

Thus, we will see at least one, probably two PLAN frigates or destroyers in the Indian Ocean accompanied by a supply ship, maybe even an LPD. Port access may be granted by Pakistan, Yemen, Sri Lanka or Kenya. Thereafter, the PLAN could increase its presence gradually based on the gained experience, e.g. ship refueling on open waters. However, that does not mean that China will start fighting in the Indian Ocean. The most likely missions are counter-piracy, military diplomacy, disaster relief, evacuation of Chinese citizens, and contribution to other international operations.

Chinese SSBN in Sanya 

    Of  the PLAN submarines, probably only SSN will continue to operate in the Indian Ocean, due to their operational range. However, unlike the Soviets there will be noChinese SSBN west of Malacca Strait. Why send them straight into the range of Indian and US anti-submarine warfare capabilities? In home waters, the Chinese can protect their second strike capability with surface warships and air forces.

However, the good news is that China is not going to freeride on the stability in the Indian Ocean that is provided by others, namely the US. Beyond the discussions about conflict, China`s presence will contribute to safe and secure sea lanes and to stability in the wider Indian Ocean area. They will do so simply because it is in China’s national interest.

Beyond the Indo-Pacific

PLAN missile frigate Yangcheng in the Med 

After numerous friendly visits and a 2011 evacuation operation in Libya, the PLAN is now engaged in a real operation in the Mediterranean (Med’). Together with Danish, Norwegian, British, and Russian warships, one PLAN frigate is protecting Danish and Norwegian freighters transporting Syria’s chemical weapons to a US vessel for the c-weapons’ destruction. China’s Med’ deployment is hardly motivated by altruistic regard for what Europeans call “international responsibility”. Instead, the Chinese are just taking any opportunity they get to gain more operational experience.

In addition, China was only able to deploy to the Med’ due to its Indian Ocean presence. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the PLAN operates in European homewaters from Cyprus, an EU member state. Interestingly, a Greek follower commented on this blog (comments are in German) that the EU is almost irrelevant in the Eastern Med’. Given his perspective is right, China stepped into a vaccuum provided by Europe. That is how maritime power shifts become real. However, once Syria’s chemical weapons are destroyed, probably in late 2014 or early 2015, China’s Med’ presence will end.

Moreover, we have seen Brazilian-Chinese exercises in the South Atlantic. Brasilia and Beijing seem to be happy with their naval cooperation, which makes its extension very likely. However, aside from the cooperation with Brazil and some friendly port visits, thedebate about a Chinese presence in the Atlantic has remained purely hypothetical – and it will remain so for long.

Win wars without fighting

If Peaceful Rise ever was real, it is definitely over. China’s latest Defence White Paper clearly said that China aims to win local wars under the conditions of informationization. Moreover, the White Paper outlined that China would not attack first, but if attacked, it would strike back. However, the White Paper left open what China considers an attack. An attack does not have to be a kinetic strike, but rather China could consider other states’ activities in waters claimed by China as an attack on its national sovereignty.

After China’s soft power was ruined by not immediately responding to the need for disaster relief in the Philippines (they send their hospital ship very late and only after harsh criticism from abroad), China now lets hard power speak. Obviously, Beijing came to the conclusion that it is time to openly pursue a more assertive track, including the use of military power, which does not necessarily mean the use of force.

When talking about China’s military rise, many observers mistake the use of militarypower for use of military force. Using force is always is always inefficient, due to the costs involved. However, as Sun Tzu outlined, the most efficient way to win a war is not to fight it, but rather allocate military means in a way to impose one’s will on the other side without firing a shot. That is what China is trying to do. They do not follow the Clausewitzian dictum of open war as politics by other means.

China’s ADIZ

  China’s  recently established ADIZ can be considered a test of this approach. They extended their sphere of influence by the use of military power, but without the use of force. As the test worked quite well from Beijing’s perspective, an ADIZ in the South China Sea could follow. However, China would need much more tanker aircraft for aerial refueling and aircraft carriers for enforcing an ADIZ in the southern South China Sea.

China is now actively seeking – with the use of military power as a means among others – control over areas it has not controlled before. More assertive Chinese behavior and Japanese responses increase the likelihood of unintended conflicts. The US, Japan, and South Korea will have to react to everything China is doing, because they have to save face. For that reason, maritime Asia needs a collective system of conflict prevention.

East Asia Summit: Forum for solutions

Maritime security will be a top geopolitical priority through this decade and beyond. In the 2020s, China and India, both with at least three aircraft carriers, will operate sophisticated blue-water navies. China will project power into the Indian Ocean, while India in response will demonstrate political will in the Western Pacific. Great power conflicts, with or without the use of military force, loom on the horizon, but is not inevitable. Therefore, maritime security will remain on forthcoming East Asia Summit’s (EAS) agenda.

 

Asian countries, in particular China and Japan, should agree to establish military-to-military hotlines for the opportunity to de-escalate unintended naval incidents. In terms of conflict prevention mechanisms, formal treaties are unlikely, because they would be hard to ratify in all states involved. However, by programs for mutual trust building and collective eschewal from un-announced unilateral measures, the EAS could establish a consensus for an informal modus vivendi in maritime Asia. The greatest plus of an informal modus vivendi would be that such an approach would allow all sides to save face.

Moreover, resource exploration (oil, gas, fish, minerals) have to be put on the EAS’ agenda. With ongoing globalization, increasing population, rising wealth and economic growth, sea-borne trade will grow even further, making these global economic lifelines even more vital for everyone. Now under research, deep-sea mining in the Indian and Pacific Ocean is likely to start in the 2020s. Competition over these resources will lead to the necessity to discuss how conflict can be prevented and how these resources can be used in a way that will suit all parties’ interests. If Asia manages to increase maritime interdependence in trade and resources among all countries and for mutual benefit, this makes armed conflict less likely. No country will strike its own lifelines. http://cimsec.org/

US behind Turkey's purchase of Chinese missile system: Kanwa

The primary reason for Turkey, a major US ally and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to purchase the FN FS-2000, the export version of the Chinese HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile, was not to defend its airspace but to steal critical information regarding the missile for the United States, according to Kanwa Defense Review operated by Andrei Chang, a military analyst based in Canada, also known as Pinkov.

Turkey's national interests rely on the acceptance of the United States and European Union, the article said that and for this reason it is very hard to imagine that some day Turkey will side with potential NATO adversaries such as Russia or China. The government in Ankara also realizes how much pressure will be on them if they chose to purchase Chinese instead of American air defense systems.

Kanwa said that Turkey's new cross-harbor tunnel beneath the Bosphorus was completed with investment from Japan. As Japan is now a major advocate of Turkey's accession to the European Union, the report said it is impossible for it to become a security partner with China, which is engaged in a territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea.

The report also said that Germany, a fellow NATO member, could can stop Turkey from getting too close to China through halting the provision of supplies that the Turkish navy requires for its Meko-class frigates. The United States can also refuse to sell the fifth-generation Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters to Turkey in protest against Ankara's cooperation with Beijing. This would be a very expensive price for Turkey to pay for changing sides, according to the magazine.

As most of its weapons systems are from either the United States or other NATO powers, Turkey is unlikely to purchase Chinese missiles, Kanwa said, which is why Russia pulled its S-400 from the competition. Apparently, Turkey is trying to steal critical data from the HQ-9 for its allies through the purchase of the Chinese missile, following the example of South Korea when it previously did the same with the Russian-built Sukhoi Su-35 fighter.http://www.wantchinatimes.com/

The Pentagon Has Figured Out How to Hunt Enemy Stealth Fighters

On Feb. 11, a U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter flew for the first time with a new infrared sensor fitted to its underbelly fuel tank.

And a year ago in the spring of 2013, War is Boring contributor David Cenciotti spotted the same heat sensor fitted to the air intake of an Air Force F-16 at a war game in Nevada.

Around the same time, the Air National Guard wrapped up air-to-air testing of the Sniper IR targeting pod on an F-15C.

The near-simultaneous appearance of a range of new infrared sensors on Navy and Air Force fighters is no coincidence. It’s apparently all part of the Pentagon’s preparations for the first possible stealth air war, potentially involving radar-evading jets from the U.S., Russia and China.

Japan, South Korea and India are also working on stealth fighters. The proliferation of new warplanes able to avoid radar detection—thanks to their special shaping and coatings—compels the Americans and others to find new ways to detect enemy planes.

Hence infrared. Fighter heat sensors aren’t exactly new—the Russians have been using them for decades. But they are becoming more important in the current era of stealthy air warfare.

Lockheed’s IRST. Lockheed photo

Which stealth?

Radar stealth is a fairly old art by aviation standards, dating back to the 1960s. Engineers know they can carefully craft airframes in order to avoid presenting flat surfaces and hard angles perpendicularly to a radar. That minimizes radar bounce-back.

Equally, some materials can actually absorb radar energy instead of returning it. Apply that stuff to the outside of your plane and you can shave an order of magnitude from its radar signature.

But it’s much harder to mask a plane’s heat signature. Combusting jet fuel and moving quickly through the air obviously creates huge amounts of heat. The Mach-three SR-71 spy plane—admittedly an extreme example—registered 800 degrees Fahrenheit at its nose during high speeds.

Some warplane designs try to isolate heat rather than removing it. The A-10 tank-killer, for example, keeps its engines above the fuselage and between the tail fins, blocking the view of enemy missileers on the ground—albeit imperfectly.

America’s stealth warplanes—the B-2 bomber and F-22 and F-35 fighters—reportedly use their internal fuel as heat sinks in order to keep their outside skins as cool as possible. The fuel system sucks up excess heat, conveniently using it to improve the fuel’s efficiency.

But fuel sinks pose big design and managements challenges. As you burn off gas during flight, you lose the ability to absorb heat internally and must send more of it radiating out your tail pipe, where it can be more easily detected.

Air Guard F-15C with Sniper pod. Air Force photo

New eyes

All that is to say that even stealth warplanes can be hot—especially stealth planes optimized solely for radar-evasion. Relative newcomers to stealth, Russia and China might lag behind in infrared suppression.

So the Navy and Air Force are adding IR sensors to many of their planes. The Navy has begun test-flying Lockheed Martin’s Infrared Search and Track system on a Boeing F/A-18F. Adding the sensor to all 500 or so Super Hornets could cost up to $500 million.

“IRST is a passive long-range sensor system that uses infrared search and track technology to detect airborne threats and provide weapon-quality track solutions on those targets,” Lockheed explained in a release.

The sensor has the added benefit of being passive—that is, it doesn’t emitenergy, only receives it. A fighter with IRST can spot enemy targets without giving away its own location. IRST works even when the enemy is jamming your radar with electronic noise.

And if a pilot is comfortable turning on his radar, he can use IRST to help tell apart two enemy planes flying close together. “Not only can IRST detect air threats, it provides increased discrimination of threat formation at longer ranges, enhancing multiple target resolution significantly compared to radar,” according to Lockheed.

“IRST will transform the way the Super Hornet conducts air-to-air operations and allows the fleet to dominate the skies in all threat environments,” said Capt. Frank Morley, the Navy’s F/A-18 manager.

The new Lockheed sensor is actually an upgrade of the much older AN/AAS-42 sensor fitted to the Navy’s F-14D, which entered service in the early 1990s and retired in 2006.

The F-14 carried the heat sensor under its nose. To ease its addition to a wide range of American and allied planes, Lockheed offers a number of IRST attachments. The Super Hornet plugs the sensor into the front tip of a modified 400-gallon drop tank. On the F-16, the IRST attaches to a pylon that fits to the air intake.

In March 2013, eagle-eyed reporter Cenciotti spotted the sensor on an F-16 belonging to the Air Force’s 64th Aggressor Squadron, which simulates the enemy in the semi-annual Red Flag war game at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

F-22 and B-2 stealth planes attend most Red Flag exercises. The 64th’s F-16s need to be able to find them—not only to train the stealth crews in defensive tactics, but also to prepare U.S. fliers for a time, not long from now, when Russia, China and other countries could have stealth warplanes of their own.

The Air National Guard is ahead of the curve. In 2011, the reserve force began testing the Lockheed-made Sniper targeting pod on one of its approximately 130 Boeing F-15C fighters.

The Sniper pod, normally used to spot ground targets, includes much of the same technology as IRST and has “some pretty good air-to-air tracking capability,” according to Jon Sutter, Lockheed’s Sniper manager.

The two-year Sniper test was meant to improve the reserves’ ability to inspect suspicious aircraft at night—but the IR pod could also work against stealth planes. Northrop Grumman’s Litening pod reportedly has the same ability—especially in its new ATP-SE version.

The targeting pods’ anti-stealth skill might help explain why the active-duty Air Force cancelled the planned installation of the Lockheed IRST on its roughly 100 F-15s, an upgrade that could have cost more than $300 million. The flying branch could just use pods instead—although this begs the question why the Air Force fitted IRST to Lockheed F-16s.

Ironically, the Air Guard—having demonstrated an alternative to IRST—wants to revive efforts to fit the new Lockheed sensor to F-15s starting in 2015.

Programmatic chaos aside, the trend is clear. More American jet fighters are getting infrared sensors—and this could help them battle the Chinese- and Russian-made stealth fighters of the near future   War is Boring

Russian Navy to receive three additional Buyan-M class corvettes

The Russian Navy will take delivery of three more Project 21631 (Buyan-M)-class missile corvettes by the end of 2015, Russian Navy commander admiral Viktor Chirkov has revealed.

Chirkov was quoted by RIA Novosti as saying that, "The navy is expecting the Veliky Ustyug corvette this year and two more warships of the same class in 2015."

A total of nine Project 21631 (Buyan-M) corvettes have been ordered by the Russian defence ministry for the navy, six of which would be assigned to the Caspian Flotilla.

The Grad Sviyazhsk and the Uglich, the first and second Buyan-M corvettes respectively, were commissioned with the flotilla in early 2014, according to Chirkov.

In August 2013, the Zelenodolsk shipyard commenced the construction of the sixth corvette in the series, the Vyshny Volochek.
Capable of cruising at a maximum speed of 25k, the 949t Project 21631 ships, the missile variants of Project 21630, are armed with Kalibr (SS-N-27) anti-ship missiles, 100mm and 30mm guns, and Igla-1M air defence missiles.

In a separate development, the Russian Navy's first diesel-powered Project 22160 patrol ship, Vasily Bykov, has been launched during a ceremony at Russia's Zelenodolsky shipyard.

Armed with a single 57mm cannon, heavy machine guns, air defense systems and optional missile launchers, the 1,300t ship will be used for economic zone patrol, search-and-rescue operations, anti-piracy and anti-smuggling activities, environmental monitoring, as well as coastal defence and escort service.

Planned to feature a helicopter landing pad on its aft deck, the vessel will have a range of 6,000nm.

Russian captain first rank Igor Dygalo said, "This ship is a vessel of a new generation, built according to modular principles."

A navy spokesperson said a total of six ships of the class are expected to be built by 2019.http://www.naval-technology.com/