SETA’s Director of Security Research Assistant Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş was the moderator of the panel on “Strategic Air Defense Systems and Turkey’s Road Map” organized by SETA and the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries. Undersecretary for Defense Industries Prof. İsmail Demir, Faculty Member of MEF University Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Faculty Member of İzmir University of Economy Dr. Sıtkı Egeli, Aselsan Deputy Director General Mr.Mustafa Kaval and Roketsan Deputy Director General Dr. Sartuk Karasoy attended the event as panelists. Turkey’s strategies for the upcoming period were examined during the panel and the participants were informed on the significant clues regarding the cancelled T-LORAMIDS program.
The event was launched with the opening remark of SETA Director of Security Research Assistant Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş and Undersecretary for Defense Industries Prof. İsmail Demir took the floor as the first panelist. In his speech, Prof. Demir pointed out that missile defense systems were systems utilizing quite complicated systems in an integrated manner and mentioned that in case of a ballistic missile attack, following the identification of the threat, the threat should be classified through the supersensitive guided systems and then immediately destroyed. Prof. Demir added that in order to struggle against the stratified threats, the technological development capable of achieving the fight against greater threats should be accomplished immediately.
Prof. Demir stated that developing Turkey’s Air Defense System fell under the responsibility of the Undersecretariat and added that Turkey was undergoing a tender process. Prof. Demir underlined important subjects regarding the upcoming period: “With the announcement of the winner of the T-LORAMIDS tender, several arguments in world opinion arose. Turkey’s increasing its self-sufficiency in Air Defense Systems -as well as all other areas- is the point we attach importance. Our plans regarding this point are continuing. Considering this issue, our domestic defense industry companies are continuing their activities in the field of Low and Medium Altitude Air Defense Systems. We believe that these efforts will make significant contribution to our Indigenous Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems”. Given the ever-changing world conjuncture, Prof. Demir pointed out that the decision-makers desired to see their systems operating in the field as soon as possible, he emphasized that Turkey needed to remain prepared against surrounding threats at all times and immediately create its air defense shield.
In his speech, Head of MEF University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu underlined the requirement of the correct identification of the threat during the struggle against threats, regardless of its type. Prof. Kibaroğlu stated that the identification, categorization and eventually the destruction capacities regarding the military and ballistic threats should be acquired immediately. Reminding the participants that Turkish Air Forces’ existing air defense systems had the capacity to resist merely to threats of certain levels; Prof. Dr. Kibaroğlu added that Turkey had a limited defense capacity with the current resources and capabilities. Prof.Dr. Kibaroğlu also reminded that Turkey’s interest in missile defense systems was not new and told that especially military circles were interested in this area in the 90s and added that during the 1st Gulf War in 1991, hit rate of the Patriot missiles was 13 percent. Stating that following the Gulf War in 90s, there was no progress in the ARROW project upon which Turkey, US and Israel negotiated and told that when the representatives of USA and Israel were inquired about the reason behind this, each party blamed each other. Prof. Dr. Kibaroğlu expressed that though Turkey was not yet at the desired point, it was now in a better place considering the defense area and stressed that the country needed to strengthen its Smart Power in order to avoid the surrounding threats. Prof. Dr. Kibaroğlu concluded his speech saying that the Western allies’ insistence on Turkey not procuring its missile defense system from China was meaningless as these countries did not make use of the opportunities handed over them many times before.
In his remark, İzmir Economy University Faculty Member Dr. Sıtkı Egeli expressed that the air defense systems were far more different than the conventional weapon systems and they remained in an area where countries’ defense strategies and “Grand Strategies” intersected each other. Touching upon the features of the ballistic missiles, Dr. Egeli warned the participants that the identification of such missiles were quite difficult before and after their launch and that as a result of their ability to move fast, the reaction duration of the targets were quite short. Reminding that most of the ballistic missile flights took place at the in space, Dr. Egeli noted that this feature made the conventional preparations meaningless. Dr. Egeli spoke of another feature of the ballistic missiles and said that their speed increased in parallel with the increase in their range and thus it became more impossible to resist against them. Dr. Egeli mentioned that against the ballistic missile attacks, in addition to the air defense systems, special sensors and satellite systems located in space to make the first warning were required and underlined that these systems were currently owned by USA, Russia and Israel. Stating that in case of the existence of the sufficient technology, it would be relatively easier to stop the ballistic missiles in space, Dr. Egeli stressed that the sooner a missile is stopped, the wider the protected area would be. On the other hand, Dr. Egeli said that the attacking party would always be a step ahead of the defense when the ballistic missiles are at hand and stated that defense would be harder and more expensive. Addressing the statements of the representatives of the USA, that spent $ 350 billion toward missile defense systems in the last thirty years, Dr. Egeli emphasized that this was not a battle to be won on the financial side. Dr. Egelistated that Turkey has been under the missile threat since the 1960s and that it became interested in the systems with ranges over 300 kilometers in 1990s. Dr. Egeli recalled that the ranges of the ballistic missiles manufactured by Iran exceeded 1.100 kilometers and stressed that following this development, the stage of preventing these missiles in space should be adopted step by step. Dr. Egeli additionally noted that Turkey became interested in the Russian ballistic missiles since 2008 as Russia started to utilize these missiles against Georgia. Lastly, Dr. Egeli said that Turkey’s overall air defense was based on aircrafts, that ground stationed systems were weak and therefore the country suffered from an overall weakness.
In his presentation, Roketsan Deputy Director General Dr. Sartuk Karasoy summarized the technological developments in missile defense systems and mentioned that the ballistic missile defense systems’ operations were getting more complex each day in parallel with the technological developments in that field. Dr. Karasoy underlined a technical feature of the ballistic missiles is that of the impossibility of interfering them during a major part of their flight after they are launched. Dr. Karasoy told that even though they expected that the SM-3 and THAAD systems would be available for Turkey’s access within the NATO framework, due to the role determined for Turkey as part of NATO’s overall defense concept, Turkey was unable to access these systems. He underlined that, therefore, Turkey should be developing a “Turkey centered system” to abolish its foreign dependency. Dr. Karasoy added that in addition to a ballistic missile defense system Turkey has to adopt “space” as a strategic target in order to acquire a ballistic missile defense capability in a wider sense.
Aselsan Deputy Director General Mr. Mustafa Kaval made a presentation on the air and missile defense systems and assessed Turkey’s current status in these areas. Mr. Kaval stated that the air and missile defense systems should actually be defined as the system of systems for in these systems numerous systems were functioning in an integrated manner. Mr. Kaval noted that the communication infrastructure, sensor systems, weapon systems and the command control systems within the air and missile defense systems were extremely complex structures nested within each other. Mr. Kaval stressed that a severe system engineering approach was necessary for all levels in order to make progress in the studies and activities to this end and reminded the participants of the vital importance of the correct need assessment. Moreover, Mr. Kaval told that the acquisition of T-LORAMIDS system-program would not be fully solving Turkey’s air defense requirements, and underlined that increasing the number of such systems, their expansion were required for locating Turkey under the full protection of the shields offered by these systems.
In the Q&A session of the panel, regarding the question about the current situation of Turkey within the scope of the missile defense system tender, Undersecretary for Defense Industries Prof. İsmail Demir expressed that the tender process was a dynamic one in the sense of proposals and negotiations and Turkey was about to reach a final decision taking Turkey’s needs and interests into consideration and that they passed to the final stage of the tender.
Where is Turkey Heading after the T-LORAMIDS?
Following these remarks, an important decision was reached on 15th November 2015 regarding the T-LORAMIDS program that has been occupying the agenda for quite a long while and the cancellation of the tender that was initiated eight years ago was announced to the public opinion. So, how was the procurement plan initiated? How was Turkey’s Ballistic Missile Threat perception formed? In order to reach a better understanding and see the big picture, we need to reconsider the cold war era and observe the Middle East geography dominated by wars and conflicts. Turkey’s introduction to the ballistic missiles threat that was increased especially in the 1980s, developed and expanded their utilization scale occurred in 1991 with the 1st Gulf operation. The SCUD, R-17 and EL-Hussain missiles in the inventory of the Iraqi Army were used against the coalition countries and Israel many times. Within this scope, Turkey remaining in the hot line began to perceive the Ballistic Missile threat this close for the first time. With the ballistic missile attacks displayed live and the scale of the threat formed and the escalating defense perception, made it compulsory for Turkey, which was one of the most important actors of the conflicted region, to take steps to this end. In that period, against the Ballistic Missile threats, Turkey only owned the “Nike – Hercules” missiles manufactured in 1959 that were designed in line with the cold war concept and doctrines of the 1960s and intended to intercept the Soviet aircraft fleets. These systems in the inventory that were designed according to the old and cold war doctrines were way behind the rapidly developing, evolving, ballistic missile threats that were rapidly increasing their range and velocity. Protection of major cities, military bases with great importance, critical facilities in particular, had to be provided through long range air and missile defense systems and this point became one of the privileged topics of Turkey. During the Gulf War, the American Patriot systems located in Turkey were once intended to be procured via the Foreign Military Sales, however the procurement plans were suspended due to the economic crisis that Turkey went through in 1994 and as a result of the ensuing political ambiguities it could not be implemented at all.
Ten years after, in 2006, within the scope of a plan formed by the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries authorized by the Ministry of National Defense, on 30 June 2006 with a decision adopted by the Defense Industry Executive Committee, the T-LORAMIDS (Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems) Program was initiated. Following the preparation of the feasibility studies and the Request for Proposal (RFP), in 2010 RFP including the technical specifications were issued. In the tender, executed through the foreign direct procurement method, Lockheed Martin-Raytheon consortium proposed “Patriot PAC II/III”, French – Italian consortium Eurosam offered “SAMP/T”, Russian Rosoboronexport Company offered Antey 2500 and Chinese CPMEIC Company offered FD-2000 (the export version of HQ-9) to Turkey in their proposals. The final decision was announced through Defense Industry Executive Committee’s (SSIK) decree of 26th September 2013. It was decided to initiate the contract negotiations with China Company CPMIEC and in case an agreement could not be reached with them then negotiations were supposed to made with French – Italian consortium Eurosam that was the second company in the tender. Meanwhile, in order to avoid the exclusion of Eurosam and the American party from the process, Turkey reached decisions on extending the validity of the proposals for their revision two times. Taking the operational requirements of the coming 20-30 years, Turkey was determined to procure the most developed and improved systems. Moreover, in the procurement of the aforementioned system, in line with its strategic plan Turkey identified certain significant criteria such as the infrastructure to be established within the country, the joint production areas, technology transfer, industrial participation, etc. As these criteria could not be met at the expected level and for the parties could not reach an understanding, this two-year-long adventure ended on 15th November 2015.
The severe messages conveyed by the Turkish party before the cancellation were already the indicators of direction of the tender headed. A year before the cancellation of announcement, prior to the NATO Summit of 2014, President Mr.Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that there were problems with the Chinese party regarding know-how and joint production issues, that the Italian – French consortium listed as the second winner of the tender revised and submitted its proposal and that they were conducting the negotiations in this context. These declarations, uttered by the highest rank of the state, underlined that Turkey was adamant about its sine qua non criteria regarding the maximum domestic participation ratio, industrialization and technology transfer and would not take a further step before they were fully met. Following the aforementioned message from the top authority of the state, at the ADEX 2014 event that took place in Azerbaijan in September 2014, the sector’s senior executives made important remarks considering the Indigenous Long Range Air and Missile Defense System, the feasibility studies of which were carried out simultaneously with the T-LORAMIDS program. The sector’s prominent actors, Aselsan and Roketsan officials stated that they were prepared to develop Indigenous Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems with the help of the know-how they acquired from the Low and Medium Altitude Air Defense Missile Systems and by making the following remark that read, “Our negotiations on the technical scope are continuing and we reached a certain level in Low and Medium Altitude Air Defense Systems. We agreed that we had the capacity to accomplish these activities within the scope of ‘high altitude’ and believe that we would complete this program in a five-year-period”.They conveyed the message both to Turkish public opinion and to the actors competing in the tender. Following the messages given in the last quarter of 2014, the electoral atmosphere in the country, and in addition to the changes in the world conjuncture, the program did not appear in the agenda until June 2015. The negotiations were conducted quietly and then in June 2015,it was claimed within the defense source that the negotiations were blocked on the technology transfer issue. Eventually, on 15th November 2015, the cancellation of the tender was announced to publicly.
So, what are Turkey’s options now, following this decision? Has Turkey identified a Road Map?Due to their architecture, the High Altitude Air and Missile Defense Systems are composed of very complex systems and sub systems. Turkey has a threshold to get by on this issue, but fortunately there are some promising developments too. In the exclusive interview our magazine made with Aselsan’s General Manager Dr. Faik Eken in November 2015, he noted that they had the infrastructure capable of manufacturing long range search and fire control radars that were considered to be the most critical components of the Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems and said, “With our infrastructure level and with the know-how we acquired, we are capable of developing these radars. We are perfectly able to produce both the modules used in these radars and the Gallium Nitrate transistors used in the modules through our national resources. Regarding the radars, we formed the know-how capable of design and production without foreign dependence at all levels. The first application of this capacity was launched in the Low and Medium Altitude Air Defence Missile Systems “Hisar” and Self – Propelled Low Altitude Air Defense System “Korkut” projects. As Aselsan, we designed and manufactured the search and fire control radars within the scope of these projects. We are getting quite successful results in the ongoing field tests with these radars”. Additionally, in his special statement to our magazine in September 2015, Defense Industry System Projects and Logistics Deputy Undersecretary Mr. Mustafa Şeker relayed important messages by saying, “We are hoping that Turkey will be fulfilling the radar requirements of the Long Range Air and Missile Defense Systems within the next four-years-period”. These optimistic messages given by the prominent representatives of the sector may seem to pave the way in front of Turkey, yet the country has lost a great amount of time considering the urgent requirements and the increasing threat perception. And bridging this gap does not seem so easy in the short run. Unfortunately, Turkey does not have many options in this context. According to the best case scenario assessed, through the technology transfer and support accomplished in the critical technologies arena, Turkey would be putting forth a prototype system in 5 to 10 years’ time. Meanwhile, the indigenous development studies of ‘‘Hisar A’’ and ‘‘Hisar O” Projects continue and currently the sub system development and test activities are being conducted, a certain level of maturity has been reached considering the design of the ground systems and missile sub systems but it is stated that for the qualification and serial production of these systems, another 3 or 4 years’ period would be required. So, what kind of a Road Map does Turkey have ahead? Should Turkey continue its progress stage by stage with the extended version of the “Hisar A” and “Hisar-O” systems that were indigenously designed through local resources? Or would it be better to create its own high altitude air and missile defense system by making a technology transfer and shortening the period with a partner country?
The response to all of these questions surely lies beneath Turkey’s perception of threats. Are the targets, “Air Breathing Targets” such as the UAVs, Combat Aircrafts, Fighter Aircrafts, and Cruise Missiles? Or are they the ballistic missiles that contain 30% of the threat perception yet requiring a different category? Or should all of the aforementioned be considered?
Besides all of these options, during and after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to France in December 2015, the Air Forces Command and representatives of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries’ participation in the SAMP/T system’s fire test conducted in Italy indicate to us that there is still a third option on the table. 2016 will be a year that we will learn the answer to many of these questions. We wait in anticipation and we will follow the progression as this topic unfolds.
by Cem Akalın-http://www.defenceturkey.com/
